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PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LA w OF LIBEL. By Norman L. Rosenberg. Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 369. $29.95. 
In Protecting_ The Best Men, Norman L. Rosenberg1 traces chrono-
logically the law of political libel2 in the United States from the end of 
the colonial era to the present day. In his introduction, Rosenberg 
warns the reader not to expect a traditional legal history.3 He 
promises, instead, to take a new approach which "seeks to interpret 
the tangled history of . . . the law of political libel . . . by examining 
forces that are not distinctly legal, especially changes in political prac-
tices, in ideas of social and political order, and in the nature of Ameri-
can journalism" (p. 7). Because Rosenberg takes on such a complex 
set of materials, problems relating to thematic development and organ-
ization at times make the book seem confusing. On the whole, how-
ever, Rosenberg weaves this material together in a way that is both 
interesting and useful to the legal historian. 
The first of the book's two major themes is that the law of political 
libel did not "evolve" in the sense that it developed in a progressive 
and orderly manner toward a free speech ideal. Rather, Rosenberg 
posits that from one period to the next the law "ebbed and flowed," 
depending on the influence of a variety of political and social forces 
(pp. 9, 264). In support of this proposition, Rosenberg describes, in 
1. Associate Professor of History at Macalester College, and co-author of IN OUR TIMES: 
AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II (1982). Rosenberg is also author of The Law of Political Libel 
and Freedom of the Press in Nineteenth Century America: An Interpretation, 17 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 336 (1973); Alexander Addison and the Pennsylvania Origins of Federalist First-Amend· 
ment Thought, 108 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 399 (1984); The New Law of Political 
Libel: A Historical Perspective, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141 (1975); Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal 
Jurisprudence, and the Law of Libel, 1868-1884, 4 u. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 49 (1980). 
2. Rosenberg generally uses "political libel" to refer to libelous statements used in criticism 
of government. See generally pp. 10-11. 
3. Rosenberg disagrees with those traditional "whiggish" scholars who study the law of libel 
in isolation from underlying social forces and conclude that the law has evolved toward a free 
speech ideal (p. 9). See, e.g., Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903, 904 
(1960) ("What began as control of speech and press by suppression, censorship and persecution 
has come to be protection of the widest freedom for all the means of communication."). Protect· 
ing The Best Men is part of a movement in legal history which seeks to explain legal change by 
looking to underlying social, political, and economic pressures. For examples of this more com-
prehensive approach to history, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973) and 
M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). 
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chronological order and great detail, specific periods in American his-
tory during which the restrictiveness of libel law fluctuated in response 
to contemporary social events. For example, according to Rosenberg, 
although the American Revolution had a liberalizing effect on the law 
of political libel (pp. 51-55), the growing threat from a competing 
political party4 caused the Federalist-dominated Congress to attempt 
to chill political criticism by enacting the Sedition Act5 in 1798 (pp. 
79-89). As another example, Rosenberg explains that the Supreme 
Court's adoption in 1964 of a less restrictive approach in political libel 
cases was partially due to the Court's fear that libel doctrine would be 
used as a weapon against the civil rights movement. 6 These are only 
two of the several turning points that Rosenberg traces over more than 
two hundred years of American history. 
Rosenberg is probably correct in rejecting the notion that the law 
of political libel evolved in a progressive and orderly manner. As the 
author skillfully shows, legal theorists, influenced by often complex 
and unpredictable social forces, do not always elaborate doctrine in an 
orderly fashion. For example, according to Rosenberg, Thomas Coo-
ley's 7 confidence in less restrictive libel law during the mid-nineteenth 
century was largely based on increasingly popular free market theory. 8 
Intimidated by a rise in irresponsible popular journalism, Cooley later 
revised his theories in favor of more restrictive libel laws (pp. 178-89). 
Rosenberg, however, is so determined to refute those historians 
who suggest that libel law has developed in a smooth, orderly manner 
that he does not adequately address the possibility that this body of 
law, despite its ebbs and flows, did, on average, become less restrictive 
during the nineteenth century.9 Evidence in the book itself suggests 
such a progression. The Sedition Act of 1798, for example, repre-
4. Two distinct and viable political parties did not exist until 1796, when the Jeffersonian 
Republicans became the primary political opponents of the Federalists, who gained power with 
the election of John Adams as president. See, e.g., D. COLE, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 78 (1968). 
5. The Sedition Act of 1798 provided severe punishments for "false, scandalous, and mali-
cious" statements against the government. D. COLE, supra note 4, at 58. 
6. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court granted 
constitutional protection to nonmalicious criticisims of public figures. Under Sullivan, "malice" 
exists if the defendant publishes a falsehood "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not." Sullivan, 316 U.S. at 280. See also pp. 243-48. 
7. Cooley was one of the nation's first lawyer-academicians, teaching at the University of 
Michigan Law School and serving on the Michigan Supreme Court. P. 161. See generally Ro-
senberg, Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, and the Law of Libel, supra note 1 (examin-
ing Cooley's views on libel). 
8. Free market ideology, in an intellectual context, posits that the best idea will prevail if 
there is a free competition of ideas. Under this theory, since inferior ideas such as libelous false-
hoods will not ultimately gain acceptence, the courts need not play an active role in preventing 
their publication. See, e.g., Duval, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest For Truth: To-
ward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 
188-94 (1972). 
9. See, e.g., c. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL (1981). 
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sented a progressive departure from past doctrine in allowing truth as 
a defense in a libel suit (pp. 86-87). By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, an even more liberal version of political libel, allowing a condi-
tional privilege for even false political criticisms, had gained 
recognition as a "minority view" (p. 201). Finally, the Supreme Court 
in 1964 generally made this conditional privilege a constitutional re-
quirement (pp. 243-48). Only in the last chapter does Rosenberg ap-
pear to acknowledge this progression (pp. 258-62). 
The second major theme in Protecting the Best Men is that the law 
of political libel can be best understood as a tool that the "best men" 
have tried to use to bolster their positions in society. It is apparently 
to this proposition that the title Protecting the Best Men refers. During 
the seventeenth century, according to Rosenberg, ordinary small-town 
Americans frequently used libel doctrine as a means of protecting their 
reputations (pp. 12-25). During the eighteenth century, however, the 
rich and powerful began to use this doctrine to protect their political 
and social dominance (pp. 25-40). Interestingly, Rosenberg shows 
that libel law has generally failed those who have attempted to use it 
for this new purpose. The Sedition Act of 1789, for example, turned 
out to be a "relatively flimsy legal tool" against the Federalists' Jeffer-
sonian opposition (p. 265). In a subsequent example, Rosenberg ex-
plains that James Fenimore Cooper's libel actions against his critics 
"only served to discredit the legal and political principles [Cooper] 
hoped to vindicate." 10 
The book's organization sometimes makes it difficult for the reader 
to understand how Rosenberg's theories relate to the history he dis-
cusses. Rosenberg devotes the first and last chapters to discussing his 
interpretation of the historical events he recounts in the intervening 
chapters. Only in the last chapter, for example, does he discuss in any 
detail how the "best men" have tried to use the law of libel to protect 
their dominant positions in society (pp. 265-66). Because he does not 
highlight the theme in the foregoing chapters, the reader is left with-
out "this aid in unifying the complex material the book describes. 
The reader's confusion may also be amplified by Rosenberg's im-
precise style. In discussing his theories and interpretations in the last 
chapter, for example, the author refers to undefined concepts such as 
the "deeper implications of legal realism" (p. 267). He frequently uses 
imprecise terms such as "best men," "surveillance state," and "Fourth 
Estate" without explanation (pp. 200, 208, 264). Although some of 
these terms may be clear to readers with a background in history, con-
10. P. 265. Newspapers associated with the Whig political party had criticized Cooper's 
political ideas and literary talents. In response, Cooper instigated several libel suits to which he 
devoted most of his energies in 1840 and 1841. Cooper's motivation was not simply revenge, but 
also his fear that newspapers' attacks on the reputation of the landed gentry would deprive the 
country of needed leadership. Pp. 137-40. 
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fusion about the meaning of "best men" is particularly troubling since 
it is part of the title and relates to an important theme in the book. 
On the whole, Norman L. Rosenberg has succeeded in docu-
menting an enourmous amount of research on this subject. Although 
he does not fully explain some important terms and concepts, 11 his 
purpose in writing the book was not to provide detailed explanations, 
but to "sketch a broad picture ... [that] will provide the framework 
for more specialized work on particular jurisdictions and more limited 
time periods" (p. 8). Rosenberg has, indeed, uncovered an impressive 
set of primary and secondary sources and woven them together in an 
interesting way. Protecting the Best Men would serve as an excellent 
reference for a student oflegal history seeking a general framework for 
understanding libel law, as well as sources relating to a specific time-
period or event.12 
- Frank G. Zarb 
11. Evidently because of the enormous amount of material he must discuss in order to cover 
over two hundred years of American history, Rosenberg often mentions seemingly important 
events or time periods without discussing them in the degree of detail that a reader might expect. 
Rosenberg's brief discussion of the Progressive Movement, for example, is incomplete. See p. 
191. Rosenberg's discussion of other historical phenomena, however, is quite detailed. His inter-
esting discussion of Thomas Cooley, for example, spans 28 pages. See pp. 161-89. 
12. The book contains an excellent 16-page bibliography as well as a useful index. The au-
thor's 66 pages of notes, moreover, refer the reader to other studies concerning specific time 
periods or occurrences. 
